It sounds like you are using the Virtual Server settings to direct the ports. When you do this, all packets from that port go to that PC - which means only one PC can use the inbound port at a time according to the rule you provide. If you want to use the same port for multiple PC's, you need to use the Special Applications feature. You will assign a trigger port to open the communication and subsequent packets will go to that PC. This can be confusing to the router when many PC's are using the same port and does not work all the time. This is not a specific problem with the vbr but NAT funtioning in general.Check out further info here-».

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The SMC Router (other similar SOHO Routers) works on principle of Overloaded NAT, by which it uses only ONE Public Internet IP address to share among many Local IP addresses. In order to make certain application to work with Internet, these Routers have 2 option.

Virtual Server and Special Application. In short, Virtual Server is used expect inbound connection to be redirected to a specific computer / box.

Special Application is in use to open a range of ports, when a primary outbound port is activated by an application.Let me look on this 1. Virtual Servers in further detail, This would be helpful if there is any inbound traffic directed for a specific machine. If you have a Webserver, hosting at port 80.

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You open port 80 on the Virtual Server. Suppose if you add another Webserver.

Then you would be advised to configure it in a different port say port 81, and then open this port 81 accordingly. This is because, there is ONLY one Public IP addressed configure for the Router. If the webserver need to be configured for port 80, then you form a map of port 80 (private) and 81 (public) in the Virtual Server. Even by this way, the external request would refer this second Webserver by port 81 (from the clients) and NOT port 80 which has already been assigned for the first Router.If you situation is more like this, and you can't change the port on both Server and request from the client, then it's nothing more you can do.

You have to opt for a Enterprise level Router, where you can further customize the NAT or more static IP addresses and configure each IP address to specific computers. Inmuck, thank U very mush for a good answer.Virtual server means 'trigger port' technology in dictionary of SMC modem manual, isn't it?So in my case. Only way to buy a new router with supportin g more than one public IPs? Or leave all PC's in network of provider without protection? - sad and don't feet me.And if.1st way).to enter all PC's in the network of my ISP (by 2nd address) and leave only one route to destination server across router (all other routes will go throught SMC)?2nd way).to set up a proxy server. Which software is able to let me to reach the goal?

I have a related question. I have a SMC2804WBR.I have two webservers. I am trying to direct one to port 80 and the second to port 81.But I cannot seem to figure out how to get the second webserver to be accessed via port 81.On the SMC2804WBR, I have a Virtual Server which offers me the following options:Private IPService PortUnder Special Applications, I have:Triger Port/sPublic PortLets say I want 192.168.2.201 to be accessed via port 80 and 192.168.2.202 to be accessed via port 81.what would be the setup?Thanks in advance. I have spent a while trying to figure this out!

A method in one example implementation includes intercepting a network access attempt on a computing device and determining a software program file associated with the network access attempt. The method also includes evaluating a first criterion to determine whether the network access attempt is permitted and blocking the network access attempt if it is not permitted. The first criterion includes a trust status of the software program file. In specific embodiments, the trust status is defined as trusted if the software program file is included in a whitelist of trustworthy program files and untrusted if the software program file is not included in a whitelist.

In more specific embodiments, the method includes blocking the network access attempt if the software program file has an untrusted status. In further embodiments, an event is logged if the software program file associated with the network access attempt has an untrusted status. APPLICATION INFORMATIONThis Application is a continuation (and claims the benefit under 35 U.S.C. §120) of U.S. Application Ser.

12/844,892, filed Jul. 28, 2010, entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR LOCAL PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS SOFTWARE,” Inventors Rishi Bhargava, et al. This application is related to co-pending U.S.

Patent application Ser. 12/844,964, filed Jul. 28, 2010, entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR NETWORK LEVEL PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS SOFTWARE,” Inventors Rishi Bhargava, et al. The disclosures of both of the prior applications are considered part of (and are incorporated by reference in) the disclosure of this application. TECHNICAL FIELDThis disclosure relates in general to the field of network security and, more particularly, to local protection against malicious software. BACKGROUNDThe field of network security has become increasingly important in today's society.

The Internet has enabled interconnection of different computer networks all over the world. The ability to effectively protect and maintain stable computers and systems, however, presents a significant obstacle for component manufacturers, system designers, and network operators. This obstacle is made even more complicated due to the continually-evolving array of tactics exploited by malicious operators. Of particular concern more recently are botnets, which may be used for a wide variety of malicious purposes. Once a malicious software program file (e.g., a bot) has infected a host computer, a malicious operator may issue commands from a “command and control server” to control the bot.

Bots can be instructed to perform any number of malicious actions such as, for example, sending out spam or malicious emails from the host computer, stealing sensitive information from a business or individual associated with the host computer, propagating the botnet to other host computers, and/or assisting with distributed denial of service attacks. In addition, the malicious operator can sell or otherwise give access to the botnets to other malicious operators through the command and control servers, thereby escalating the exploitation of the host computers. Consequently, botnets provide a powerful way for malicious operators to access other computers and to manipulate those computers for any number of malicious purposes. Security professionals need to develop innovative tools to combat such tactics that allow malicious operators to exploit computers. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGSTo provide a more complete understanding of the present disclosure and features and advantages thereof, reference is made to the following description, taken in conjunction with the accompanying figures, wherein like reference numerals represent like parts, in which:FIG.

1 is a pictorial representation of an exemplary network environment in which various embodiments of a system and method for local protection against malicious software may be implemented in accordance with the present disclosure;FIG. 2 is a block diagram of one embodiment of a server in which components of the system may be implemented in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure;FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an example computing device in which components of the system may be implemented in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure;FIG. 4 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps associated with the system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure;FIG. 5 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps of a trust determination flow associated with the system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure;FIG. 6 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps of another embodiment of a trust determination flow associated with the system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure;FIG. 7 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps associated with the embodiment of the computing device of FIG.

8 is a simplified schematic diagram of another example computing device in which components of the system may be implemented in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure;FIG. 9 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps associated with the embodiment of the computing device of FIG. 10 is a simplified schematic diagram of another example computing device in which components of the system may be implemented in accordance with other embodiments of the present disclosure;FIG. 11 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps associated with the embodiment of the computing device of FIG. 12 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps associated with another embodiment of a trust determination flow of the system in accordance with the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS OverviewA method in one example implementation includes intercepting a network access attempt on a computing device and determining a software program file associated with the network access attempt. The method also includes evaluating a first criterion to determine whether the network access attempt is permitted and blocking the network access attempt if it is not permitted.

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Finally, the first criterion includes a trust status of the software program file. In specific embodiments, the trust status is defined as trusted if the software program file is included in a whitelist identifying trustworthy software program files and untrusted if the software program file is not included in a whitelist.

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In more specific embodiments the network access attempt is blocked if the software program file has an untrusted status. In another more specific embodiment, the method further includes searching one or more whitelists to determine whether the software program file is identified in one of the whitelists. In other more specific embodiments, the method includes evaluating a second criterion to determine whether the second criterion overrides the first criterion with the second criterion including a network access policy for the software program file. In yet another embodiment, an event may be logged if the trust status of the software program file is defined as untrusted, and such logging may occur instead of blocking the network access attempt or may occur in addition to blocking the network access attempt. Example EmbodimentsFIG. 1 is a pictorial representation of an exemplary network environment 100 in which one embodiment of a system for local protection against malicious software may be implemented.

Network environment 100 may include a local network 110 having a central server 130 and hosts 120 a, 120 b, and 120 c with executable software 122 a, 122 b, and 122 c, respectively. Local network 110 may be provided with electronic connection to other networks including, for example, wide area networks such as Internet 150.

The Internet 150 provides access to many other networks, computing devices, and web services. For example, a global server 160 may provide a database 165 containing global whitelists indicating software program files that have been evaluated and determined to be free of malicious code. In addition, malicious users such as a botnet operator 175 may also have access to the Internet 150 along with a command and control server 170, which may be manipulated by botnet operator 175 to send out and subsequently control malicious software (e.g., a bot) that attempts to infect networks, such as local network 110. In one exemplary embodiment of the system for local protection against malicious software, local protection components 124 a, 124 b, and 124 c may be installed in each host 120 a, 120 b, and 120 c, respectively, and central protection components 135 may be installed in central server 130. Central server 130 may also have access to a logged events database 131, a central untrusted software inventory 132, and an internal whitelist 133.In example embodiments, local protection components 124 on hosts 120 and central protection components 135 in central server 130 may cooperate to provide a system for local protection against malicious software.

In one embodiment, each software program file in executable software 122 a, 122 b, and 122 c of hosts 120 a, 120 b, and 120 c, respectively, is evaluated to determine a trust status (i.e., trusted or untrusted) using one or more trust evaluation techniques (e.g., whitelist comparisons, program file change comparisons, blacklist comparisons, etc.). A central untrusted software inventory 132 may include entries identifying each program file that is categorized as untrusted, and this inventory may also be locally stored on corresponding hosts 120 a, 120 b, and 120 c. In other embodiments, evaluation of software program files of executable software 122 a, 122 b, and 122 c to determine a trust status is performed in real-time for program files associated with each network access attempt. A network access attempt as used herein in this Specification is intended to include any inbound or outbound network access attempt on a host (e.g., accepting a connection request, making a connection request, receiving electronic data from a network, sending electronic data to a network).

When a software process on one of hosts 120 a, 120 b, or 120 c is associated with a network access attempt, the network access may be blocked if a trust status of any of the program files associated with the software process is determined to be untrusted. In example embodiments, the trust status may be determined using one of the untrusted software inventories or may be determined using one or more trust evaluation techniques in real-time.